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THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF UNILATERAL
CONTRACTS
Suppose A says to B, "I will give you $ioo if you walk across
the Brooklyn Bridge," and B walks-is there a contract? It
is clear that A is not asking B for B's promise to walk across
the Brooklyn Bridge. What A wants from B is the act of walk-
ing across the bridge. When B has walked across the bridge
there is a contract, and A is then bound to pay to B $ioo. At
that moment there arises a unilateral contract. A has bartered
away his volition for B's act of walking across the Brooklyn
Bridge.
When an act is thus wanted in return for a promise, a uni-
lateral contract is created when the act is done. It is clear that
only one party is bound. B is not bound to walk across the
Brooklyn Bridge, but A is bound to pay B $ioo if B does so.
Thus, in unilateral contracts, on one side we find merely an act,
on the other side a promise. On the other hand, in bilateral
contracts, A barters away his volition in return for another
promise; that is to say, there is an exchange of promises or
assurances. In the case of the bilateral contract both parties,
A and B, are bound from the moment that their promises are
exchanged. Thus, if A says to B, "I will give you $ioo if you
will promise to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge," and B then
promises to walk across the bridge, a bilateral contract is created
at the moment when B promises, and both parties are thereafter
bound. The conception of the bilateral contract, while present-
ing various theoretical difficulties, has in the main been developed
by the courts with a reasonable degree of precision; but the
unilateral contract has proven a stumbling block to nearly every
court which has had occasion to consider the question. In no
domain of the law are the opinions marked by such lack of clear
thinking.'
It is plain that in the Brooklyn Bridge case as first put, what
A wants from B is the act of, walking across the Brooklyn
Bridge. A does not ask for B's promise to walk across the
bridge and B has never given it. B has never bound himself to
' See Los Angeles Traction Co. v. Wilshire (1902) 135 Cal. 654; Plumb
v. Campbell (i8go) 129 Ill. 10I.
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walk across the bridge. A, however, has bound himself to pay
$Ioo to B, if B does so. Let us suppose that B starts to walk
across the Brooklyn Bridge and has gone about one-half of the
way across. At that moment A overtakes B and says to him,
"I withdraw my offer." Has B then any rights against A?
Again, let us suppose that after A has said "I withdraw my
offer," B continues to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge and com-
pletes the act of crossing. Under these circumstances, has B
any rights against A?
In the first of the cases just suggested, A withdrew his offer
before B had walked across the bridge. What A wanted from
B, what A asked for, was the act of walking across the bridge.
Until that was done, B had not given to A what A had requested.
The acceptance by B of A's offer could be nothing but the act
on B's part of crossing the bridge. It is elementary that an
offeror may withdraw his offer until it has been accepted.2  It
follows logically that A is perfectly within his rights in withdraw-
ing his offer before B has accepted it by walking across the
bridge-the act contemplated by the offeror and the offeree as
the acceptance of the offer. A did not want B to walk half-way
across or three-quarters of the way across the bridge. What A
wanted from B, and what A asked for from B, was a certain and
entire act. B understood this. It was for that act that A was
willing to barter his volition with regard to $Ioo. B understood
this also. Until this act is done, therefore, A is not bound, since
no contract arises until the completion of the act called for.
Then, and not before, would a unilateral contract arise. Then,
and not before, would A be bound.
2 Payne v. Cave (789) 3 T. R. 148. The authorities are collected in
Williston, Wald's Pollock on Contracts, pp. 27, 28. I cannot agree with
Mr. Williston's suggestion that "an option or offer under seal is irre-
vocable during the time which it specifies." Any offer of any kind may
be revoked at any moment before acceptance, but the revocation of an
offer of the nature referred to by Mr. Williston may subject the offeror
to an action for damages if the right of revocation be exercised. In
other words, the contract whereby the offeror agrees to hold an offer
open for a specified time is broken when the offer is revoked, and the
breach, like all breaches of contract, is actionable. This is quite a dif-
ferent proposition, however, from stating that offers of this kind are
"irrevocable." No offer is irrevocable. Thus, if A gives B $0oo for B's
promise to keep a certain offer open for one week, B thereby contracts
to do this. B may revoke his offer, but if he does so, he runs the risk of
a damage suit by A.
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The objection is made, however, that it is very "hard" upon
B that he should have walked half-way across the Brooklyn
Bridge and should get no compensation. This suggestion, in-
variably advanced, might be dismissed with the remark that
"hard" cases should not make bad law. But going a step further,
by way of reply, the pertinent inquiry at once suggests itself,
"Was B bound to walk across the Brooklyn Bridge?" The
-answer to this is obvious. By hypothesis, B was not bound to
walk across the Brooklyn Bridge. B had never surrendered his
volition with regard to walking across the bridge. B had never
promised A that he would walk across the bridge. There had
been no interchange of promises. A was bound to pay B $Ioo
in the event that B should walk across the bridge, but B had not
bound himself to walk. It follows that at the moment when A
overtook B, after B had walked half-way across the bridge, that
B was not then bound to complete the crossing of the bridge.
B, on his side, could have refused -at that time, or at any other
time, to continue to cross the bridge without making himself in
any way legally liable to A. If B is not bound to continue to
cross the bridge, if B is will-free, why should not A also be
will-free? Suppose that after B has crossed half the bridge he
gets tired and tells A that he refuses to continue crossing. B,
concededly, would be perfectly within his rights in so speaking
and acting. A would have no cause of action against B for dam-
ages. If B has a locus poenitentiae, so has A. They each have,
and should have, the opportunity to reconsider and withdraw.
Not until B has crossed the bridge, thereby doing the act called
for, and accepting the offer, is a contract born. At that moment,
and not one instant before, A is bound, and there is a unilateral
contract. Critics of the doctrine of unilateral contract on the
ground that the rule is "hard" on B, forget the primary need for
mutuality of withdrawal and in lamenting the alleged hardships
of B, they completely lose sight of the fact that B has the same
right of withdrawal that A has. To the writer's mind, the doctrine
of unilateral contract is thus as just and equitable as it is logical.
So long as there is freedom of contract and parties see fit to
integrate their understanding in the form of a unilateral con-
tract, the courts should not interfere with their evident under-
standing and intention simply because of alleged fanciful
hardship.
-Suppose, reverting to the second case, that B completes the
act of crossing the bridge after A has told him that the offer
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it withdrawn. Here too, B has no rights against A, since B had
not accepted the offer until after A had duly communicated to
B its revocation. An offer cannot be accepted after it has been
revoked.3  B is laboring under an unrelievable error of law in
proceeding to accept an offer which, as far as he was concerned,
had ceased to exist.
It will be noted that in the Brooklyn Bridge cases there is no
unjust enrichment of A and consequently no occasion for quasi-
contractual recovery by B. Let us assume a different set of
facts. Suppose A says to B, "If you build a garage on my
land, I will give you $i,ooo." There is no interchange of prom-
ises, and it is clear that a unilateral contract is contemplated by
the parteis. Suppose B starts to build the. garage on A's land
and after it is one-half completed, A then says to B, "I with-
draw my offer." It is clear that B had not yet accepted the offer
of A at the time of its revocation, and, therefore, that B is not
entitled to recover in an action of contract. B could have ceased
building the garage at any time, since he had never agreed to
complete it; therefore, A has, and should have, the same privilege
to draw back on his side. This conclusion cannot be considered
as unjust, for B is not deprived thereby of any right in respect
of the unfinished garage. Prima facie, that has become part of
A's realty. If it is assumed that it is not a permanent accession
to the realty of A, then it must be treated as personal property.
As neither A nor B contemplated a sale of an unfinished garage,
title to the garage remains in B so long as it is incomplete.
Hence, on A's withdrawal of his offer, B has the right to retake
the unfinished garage in specie, or, if possession is refused him,
recover its reasonable value in an action of trover. It is plain,
therefore, that a strict adherence to the doctrine of unilateral
contract works no hardship on B in this case. It may be, how-
ever, that the garage, before completion, became part of the
freehold of A, brick by brick. In this event, B may not remove
the unfinished garage after A withdraws his offer. But this is
so, be it noted, not because A exercised his legal right to with-
draw his offer before its acceptance, but because the garage as
erected becomes part of A's land, by a rule of the law of real
property, and the law will not permit B to remove what no longer
3 Byrne & Co. v. Van Tienhoven & Co. (188o) 5 C. P. D. 344; Steven-
son, Jacques & Co. v. McLean (i88o) 5 Q. B. D. 346; Henthorn v. Fraser,
[1892] 2 Ch. 27.
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belongs to him. Yet, in a case like this, it seems that A is
unjustly enriched by an improvement to his land, consisting of
one-half a garage, if no return therefor is made to B. If the
law will permit A, without B's consent, to retain this improve-
ment to the land, it is only just that the law should afford B
compensation for the improvement he made, even against A's
express dissent. Accordingly, B should be permitted to recover
from A (quantum valebat) the reasonable value of the extent
to which the land of A is enriched unjustly at B's expense. Such
procedure in quasi-contract affords a just and equitable solution
of the problem, without offending any rules of logic, clear-think-
ing, and contract law. An offer contemplating an act as its
acceptance is revocable at any time before the act has been
performed. Yet, a recovery may be permitted in quasi-contract
in any instance, where defendant would be otherwise unjustly
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff.
In the case of Offord v. Davies, the Court of Common Pleas
correctly applies the doctrine of unilateral contract.4  The de-
fendants agreed jointly and severally to guarantee for the space
of twelve months the due payment of all bills of exchange
which the plaintiff might discount for a third party. The offer
contemplated a series of unilateral contracts. Each act of dis-
counting would operate as a separate transaction. Before certain
bills were discounted, defendants withdrew their offer. The
court rightly held that they were within their rights in so acting.
The interest in this case lies not only in the opinion of the court,
but in the interesting discussion that took place between the
Judges and E. James, Q. C., in the course of the argument of
the appeal. Williams, J., said, "Suppose I guarantee the price
of a carriage to be built for a third party who, before the car-
riage is finished and consequently before I am bound to pay for
it, becomes insolvent, may I recall my guaranty?" Mr. James
replied, "Not after the coach-builder has commenced the car-
riage." Thereupon, Erle, C. [., said, "Before it ripens into a
contract either party may pithdraw and so put an end to the
matter. But the moment the coach-builder has prepared the
materials he would probably be found by the jury to have con-
tracted." Erie, C. J., thus recognized the conception of unilateral
4 (1862) 12 C. B. N. S. 748. The decision is reprinted in Keener, Cases
on Contracts (2d ed., Wormser & Loughran) 39-42.
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contracts. If A says to B, "I will give you $5o0 if you build
a carriage for me," A has the right to withdraw until the car-
riage is built. Not until then would the offer of A be accepted,
not until then would it ripen into a contract. Therefore, as
the Chief Judge says, until that moment, "either party may
withdraw and so put an end to the matter." Sometimes a
close question of fact is presented as to whether a bilateral or a
unilateral contract was intended by the parties. The Chief Judge
shrewdly surmises that if the oral remarks were passed upon
by a jury, the jury would infer, if possible, that a bilateral con-
tract had been entered into, in other words that mutual promises
had been interchanged, and would-in the usual loose fashion
of juries-find the evidence of this in the commencement of
work by the coach-builder. If the contract contemplated was
unilateral, however, a verdict based upon any such process of
deliberation might properly be set aside as against the evidence.
The most curious instance of reasoning on the subject of
unilateral contracts is that of the Supreme Court of California
in a comparatively recent decision, Los Angeles Traction Co. v.
Wilshire.5 The defendants in that case agreed to pay the plain-
tiff $2,ooo on the completion of the plaintiff's street railway.
Plaintiff did some work on the railway. Defendants revoked
their offer before the railway was completed. It was conceded
that the offer contemplated a unilateral contract. The court
held that when plaintiff had paid money and had begun work in
reliance on the offer, the contract suddenly became bilateral,
and held defendants liable. The court said, in effect, that when
the consideration-the act of building the street railway-had
been partly performed, the contract by some magical process
then took on a bilateral character. This is a most astounding
doctrine, and the court states no authority in support of its
remarkable rule that an offer which, if accepted, would consti-
tute a unilateral contract, becomes a bilateral contract by part
performance of the act required. The proposition needs only to
be stated to refute itself. Defendants did not ask for any
promise from plaintiff. Defendants asked for an act from plain-
tiff, the completion of a certain street railway. Defendants had
an absolute right to impose any condition at all in their offer.
5 (19o2) 135 Cal. 654. The decision is reprinted in Keener, Cases on
Contracts (2d ed., Wormser & Loughran) 42-44.
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It is elementary that an offer must be accepted according to its
terms,8 and the offer could not be accepted by plaintiff except
by building the street railway. Plaintiff had never agreed or
promised to build the street railway and would have been under
no legal liability to defendants if it had refused to complete the
road. 'Common sense, as well as a decent regard for justice,
should surely afford to defendants the same opportunity of with-
drawal possessed by plaintiff, and it follows that defendants'
notice of revocation should have been held effective.
The writer can see no injustice whatever in the operation of
the doctrine of unilateral contract. It is logical in theory, simple
in application, and just in result. The principle underlying it
was stated accurately by the Common Pleas in 1873 when Brett,
J., said, "If I say to another, 'if you will go to York, I will
give you £ioo,' that is in a certain sense a unilateral contract.
He has not promised to go to York but if he goes, it cannot be
doubted that he will be entitled to receive the kIoo. His going
to York at my request is a sufficient consideration for my
promise."7  True unilateral contracts are not infrequently met
with in the practice of the law. Properly understood, and
logically applied, the conception presents few difficulties.
I. MAURICE WORMSER.
Fordham University School of Law.
6 Hyde v. Wrench (184o) 3 Beay. 334; Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v.
Columbus Rolling Mill (I886) ii9 U. S. i49; Wittwer v. Hurwitz (ig5)
216 N. Y. 259, 264. An acceptance upon terms varying from those of the
offer, no matter how slightly, is a rejection of the offer. Cartmell v.
Newton (1881) 79 Ind. i:
7 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Witham (1873) L. R. 9 C. P. 16, opinion
of Brett, J. See also, Biggers v. Owen (887) 79 Ga. 658; Cook v.
Casler (19o3) 87 App. Div. (N. Y.) 8; Butchers' Advocate Co. v. Berkof
(1916) 94 Misc. (N. Y.) 299.
